Evaluating the welfare effects of alternative monetary arrangements by Ayse Imrohoroglu & Edward C. Prescott
Evaluating the Welfare Effects 
of Alternative Monetary 
Arrangements (p. 3) 
Ayse Imrohoroglu 
Edward C. Prescott 
The Labor Market Implications 
of Unemployment Insurance 
and Short-Time Compensation (p. 11) 
Randall Wright Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 
Vol. 15, NO. 3 ISSN 0271-5287 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving 
policymaking by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental 
authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by V. V. Chari, Kathleen S. 
Rolfe, and Martha L. Starr. Typeset by Correan M. Bona and Joseph R. 
Piepgras. Graphic design by Phil Swenson and Barbara Birr, Public Affairs 
Department. 
Address comments and questions to the Research Department, Federal 
Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 (telephone 612-340-2341). 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or 
the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review Summer 1991 
Evaluating the Welfare Effects 
of Alternative Monetary Arrangements* 
Ayse Imrohoroglu 
Assistant Professor 
of Finance and Business Economics 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles 
Edward C. Prescott 
Adviser 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
and Professor of Economics 
University of Minnesota 
In this paper we construct a computable general equilibrium 
model, calibrate it to selected data for the U.S. economy, and 
use it to explore the welfare effects of various monetary 
arrangements. We find that the key feature of any monetary 
arrangement is its equilibrium after-tax real return schedule on 
liquid assets held by households. If this schedule is the same 
for two different arrangements, then so are the welfare effects. 
Further, the amounts of seigniorage collected—that is, the 
difference between tax receipts and government expenditures 
net of interest payments on the government debt—are the 
same as well. We find that relative to a tax on labor income, 
seigniorage is a poor source of revenue. In particular, we find 
that if the after-tax real return on saving deposits is -5 per-
cent, as it was on average in the United States in the 1974—78 
period, welfare is 0.5 percent of consumption lower than it 
would be if the after-tax real return were zero, as it approxi-
mately was in the United States in both the 1964-68 and 
1984-88 periods. 
The work builds on that of Imrohoroglu (forthcoming), 
who finds that for worlds in which non-interest-bearing nomi-
nal assets are the only liquid assets, the cost of constant infla-
tion is far greater than the area under the empirical demand 
for money relation. With such arrangements, the after-tax real 
return is the negative of the inflation rate. The key feature of 
her model is that agents hold money in order to smooth con-
sumption in the face of idiosyncratic income variability for 
which there is no insurance.
1 Her structure is in the permanent 
The Editorial Board for this paper was V. V. Chari, Harold L. Cole, 
Edward J. Green, and Martha L. Starr. 
income tradition, with people varying money holdings in or-
der to smooth consumption. This feature is not the one upon 
which Bailey (1956) focuses when he estimates the cost of in-
flation as the area under the demand for money function. Nei-
ther is it the one upon which Cooley and Hansen (1989, 
1991) focus in their applied general equilibrium analysis of 
the cost of inflation. They, with their cash-in-advance con-
straint, are focusing on the transactional role of money. In fo-
cusing on the consumption-smoothing role, and implicitly also 
on savings for special needs, we are not arguing that this 
transactional feature is unimportant. Our findings do indicate 
that the welfare implications of moderate inflation, provided 
it is associated with correspondingly lower real returns on 
liquid assets held by households, are significantly different in 
economies where liquid assets are used for self-insurance pur-
poses than in economies where they are used for transaction 
purposes.
2 
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1 In precluding other insurance technologies, we are following, among others, 
Bewley (1980), Lucas (1980), and Scheinkman and Weiss (1986). Townsend (1980) 
and Green (1987) study economies with features that severely limit or preclude 
insurance of idiosyncratic risks. For a review and extension of this literature, see Kehoe, 
Levine, and Woodford 1990. 
2 Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991) find that, for a calibrated economy with 
homogeneous agents and a cash-in-advance constraint, an inflation tax is not more 
burdensome than a labor income tax. 
3 This work also builds on the Dfaz-Gimenez and Prescott 
(1990) extension to imrohoroglu's work. Like her, they have 
a continuum of agents with identical preferences and idiosyn-
cratic shocks to the productivity of their time in the market 
sector. Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), we as-
sume labor is indivisible, so agents either work some institu-
tionally determined workweek or do not work at all. Theoreti-
cal justification for this assumption is provided by Homstein 
and Prescott (1989), who find that for empirically reasonable 
elasticities, if the hours that capital can be operated is permit-
ted to vary, the equilibrium behaves as if there were an insti-
tutionally determined workweek. Additional theoretical sup-
port for this assumption is provided by Diaz-Gimenez (1991), 
who finds that self-insurance through variation in the holding 
of liquid assets is a good substitute for the Rogerson (1988) 
lottery scheme. 
In this study a technology is introduced to intermediate 
large-denomination nominal bills that the government issues. 
This extension permits the consideration of open market oper-
ations and the introduction of various legal constraints such as 
interest rate ceilings and reserve requirements, which are fea-
tures of arrangements that have been employed in the United 
States in the postwar period. We find that the cost of inflation 
depends upon the institutional arrangements employed. Two 
arrangements with identical inflation rates and government 
expenditures can have very different welfare costs. This point 
has been made by Lucas (1981) in his comments on Fischer's 
(1981) estimate of the cost of inflation. What we evaluate 
here is an arrangement that must specify which contracts are 
enforceable and the nature of the tax systems. 
In this study we also introduce uncertainty in monetary 
policy, which is defined by the process on the nominal inter-
est rate and the inflation rate. With this extension, the state of 
the economy at a point in time must specify the entire distri-
bution of the continuum of individuals as indexed by their as-
set and idiosyncratic human capital shock, along with the cur-
rent value of the Markov process indexing monetary policy. 
In the first section of this paper, we specify our class of 
model economies. In the second section, we define the equi-
librium and specify our computation procedure used to com-
pute it. In addition, we calibrate the economy to some key 
features of the U.S. economy. In the third section, we report 
the results of three sets of experiments. The first set of experi-
ments employs an extreme legal constraint that forbids the 
payment of interest on deposits at financial intermediaries. 
We evaluate the welfare effect of the seigniorage tax in this 
world relative to that of an income tax on labor and interest 
income. The second set of experiments also forbids the pay-
ment of interest on deposits, but it includes random variation 
in the rate of inflation. The third set of experiments entails an 
arrangement that permits interest to be paid on deposits, as do 
the arrangements actually employed in the United States in 
the postwar period. For all the arrangements in this set, the 
after-tax real return on deposits is the same, as are the welfare 
effects. Inflation rates, however, are different across these ar-
rangements. This demonstrates that except for the very special 
case of arrangements in which interest paid on deposits is 
zero, it does not make sense to speak of an inflation tax. 
Model Structure 
The economy consists of a continuum of initially identical 
agents who maximize 
(1) ElY, P'//(c,,!-«,)) 
where 0 < p < 1 is their subjective time discount factor and 
ct > 0 is their consumption of the perishable consumption 
good in period t. Parameter x is the total endowment of pro-
ductive time, and 0 < nt < x is the amount of time allocated 
to market activities. Consequently, x - nt is leisure. The utility 
function is assumed to have the following form: 
(2) u{ct,T-n) = (1-g)"1 {[cAx-ny-^-l] 
where the parameter 0 < y < l and the degree of risk aversion 
a > 0 and a ^ 1. An agent faces a productivity shock, sn that 
is time-varying and independent across agents. The process 
for this idiosyncratic shock is assumed to follow a finite-state 
Markov chain with the transition probabilities n(sj) = 
prob{s,+1 = sf\st = s), where / e {l,2,...,«v}. All the 7t(s/) 
are strictly positive. These processes are independent across 
agents. 
At time t an agent's output is given by 
(3) w(st)nt 
where w(st) is the productivity parameter and, again, nt is 
labor services that the worker provides. Since labor is as-
sumed to be indivisible, nt takes only two values. If an agent 
is employed, nt = 1, and the agent receives the real wage rate 
w(st). If an agent is not employed, nt = 0, and that agent re-
ceives no income from the labor market. 
Agents in this economy also face an aggregate shock, zt, 
that describes the exogenous changes in the monetary policy. 
The process for this aggregate shock is assumed to follow a 
finite-state Markov chain with transition probabilities x(
z/) 
= prob{z/+1 = z\zt = zj for z, z e {1,2,. 
The Monetary Arrangement 
There are two assets issued by the government. The first asset 
is currency, which does not bear interest. The second asset is 
a Treasury bill, which pays nominal interest RTB(z). The gov-
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ernment sets the return on the T-bill and the deposit reserve 
requirement ratio, RR. Agents cannot hold interest-bearing 
nominal government debt. This debt must be intermediated by 
banks. 
There is a constant return-to-scale technology (relative to 
the number of depositors) that can intermediate government 
debt, and there is free access to this technology. Associated 
with each interest-bearing account, there is a real fixed cost o^ 
and a nominal cost a, per dollar intermediated. Competition 
in the banking sector determines the nominal return, 
(4) RD(z) = (\-RR)RTB(z)-a, 
on deposits D > 0. If Pt is the price of a unit of the consump-
tion good in terms of currency, then an agent must pay a fee 
of P^ if the agent maintains an interest-bearing account at 
time t. 
In equilibrium, an agent does not maintain an account if X, 
the amount of nominal assets the agent has after consumption 
and paying taxes, is less than Po^/RD. Thus, the law of mo-
tion of nominal assets At is 
(5) = X, + max{0,XtRD(z) - P^} + (l-Q)w(st)ntPt 
where 
(6) Xt = At- ctPt 
and 0 is the labor income tax rate. 
The cost of intermediating a deposit of size Dt > 0 is 
(7) 1(D) = P ,cXq + a ,Dr 
(10) a',c,x> 0 
(11) x=[a/e(z)]-c 
(12) a = x + max {0, xRD(z) - o^} + (1 -9)w(s)n 
where e(z) - PJPT_X and interest on deposits is RD(z) = 
(1 -RR)Rtb(Z) - a,. We consider only policies for which 
[1 + Rd(Z)]P < 1 for all z. This, along with the facts that 0 < 
6 < 1, w(s) > 0 for all s, and e(z) > 1, is sufficient to insure 
that this is a well-behaved discounted dynamic program. 
Agents in this economy are identical except for their current 
human capital shock s and their current asset position a. We 
let y^ be the fraction of agents of type (a,s) at a point in time. 
Society's resource constraint at that time t is 
(13) g + Y,as Ka,s,z)yas + c(a,s,z)yas 
- n(a,s,z)w(s)yas. 
Here c(a,s,z) and n(a,s,z) are optimal consumption and 
employment decisions from dynamic program (8), g is real 
government expenditures, and i(a,s,z) is the real intermedia-
tion cost per type (<a,s) agent if the current aggregate shock is 
z.
3 From (7), 
[0^ + x(a,s,z)ax \f x(a,s,z) > a^/RD(z) 
(14) i(a,s,z) = < 
[ 0 otherwise 
Finally, the equilibrium law of motion for an individual's real 
assets a is 
Those agents with Xt > PtO^!RD{z) will have Dt = Xr Those 
with smaller X, will have Dt = 0 and currency holdings equal 
to Xr Total intermediation is the sum of the 1(D) over all 
agents with X > POqIRd(z). 
The Agent's Problem 
The agent's problem in real terms is a stationary discounted 
dynamic program. We let lowercase letters denote the real 
values of flow variables. In the case of nominal assets, we let 
at = AJPt_x, where At is the beginning-of-period nominal 
assets. Finally, a is the beginning-of-next-period value of 
stock a. With this notion, an agent's optimality equation is 
(8) v(a,s,z) = max{i/(c,T-«) + $E{v(a\s\z)\s,z)\ 
where the maximization is over (a',c,njc) and is subject to 
(9) {0,1} 
(15) a = f(a,s,z). 
Calibration and Equilibrium 
For the environment to be fully specified, it is necessary to 
choose specific values for the parameters of this model. We 
calibrate this economy so that certain key statistics for the 
model economy match those of the U.S. economy. 
We choose the model's time period to be six weeks. The 
choice for the time period is dictated by computational con-
siderations. Shortening of the period increases computation 
costs significantly but does not affect conclusions. The subjec-
tive time discount factor, (3, is assumed to be 0.995, which 
implies an annual subjective time discount rate of 4 percent. 
The parameter y is chosen to be 0.33, which implies a share 
3 Our definition of consumption is not the same as the one used in the national 
income and product accounts. Our definition excludes intermediation service. 
5 of leisure of two-thirds. The degree of risk aversion, a, is se-
lected to be 4. The exponent on consumption, which is the 
product of 7(1-a), is therefore -1. Total endowment of pro-
ductive time is taken to be 2.2222. Thus, on average, when 
people choose to work, they will allocate 45 percent of their 
productive time to market activities. 
The real wage that a worker receives is a function of that 
worker's idiosyncratic productivity shock s. Real wages are 
chosen such that workers are 2.5 times as productive in their 
high-productivity state, 5 = 1, as they are in their low-produc-
tivity state, 5 = 2. Thus, real wages are w(l) = 1.00 and w(2) 
= 0.40. 
The transition probabilities n(s,s') are chosen so that 
workers experience the high-productivity shock 92 percent of 
the time. The average duration of the low-productivity shock 
is two model periods. These choices imply that the transition 
matrix for the idiosyncratic shocks is 
0.9565 0.0435 
(16) 71 =  v 7 0.5000 0.5000 
We select the values of the parameters, the values for the real 
income in different states, and the process on the productivity 
shock in such a way that the model economy generates rea-
sonable ratios of stocks to income. 
Finally, the transition functions for the aggregate shock 
and the monetary policy rules are chosen. We experiment 
with different monetary policy regimes that cause the persis-
tence of inflation to vary, and they are described in the next 
section. 
The optimal value function and the decision rules for this 
finite-state discounted dynamic programming problem are ob-
tained by successive approximations. The state of the econo-
my is represented by z and by the fractions yas of agents with 
asset level a and idiosyncratic shock In order to compute 
the statistical properties of the equilibrium Markov process, it 
is necessary to characterize the law of motion for the state of 
the economy, (y,z). Let yt+] = h(yt,zt) describe the equilibrium 
law of motion for the state of the economy, where yast is the 
fraction of type (<ays) agents at time t. We emphasize that, to 
specify the state of the economy at a point in time, the entire 
distribution of agent types, that is, yt, is needed along with the 
aggregate shock zr 
The following equation specifies the fraction of agents of 
types {a',s') in the next period given fractions y and shock z 
and therefore defines the law of motion h: 
(17) 
where the summation is over {a,s) for which a =f{a,s,z). 
Given yt and zt, these formulas determine yt+The value 
of z,+1 given z, is random, with x(z,z') being the probability 
that zt+l = z given zt = z. The law of motion h and the transi-
tion matrix % can be used to generate realizations of the equi-
librium process for the economy given initial conditions. 
In the case that there is no aggregate uncertainty and zt is 
some constant z over time, the aggregate behavior of the 
economy is deterministic: 
(18) yt+l=h(yt,z). 
Since the process on (a,s) is a Markov chain with a single 
ergodic set and no cyclically moving subsets, {j,} converges 
to a limit which is independent of y0. For welfare comparison, 
when there is no aggregate uncertainty, we use this limiting 
distribution. 
In the case that there is aggregate uncertainty, the sequence 
of distributions {>>,} does not converge, and an alternative pro-
cedure is needed. We note that an agent's law of motion de-
pends only on the agent's own (<a,s) and the exogenous aggre-
gate state variable z. That this law of motion does not depend 
on y is crucial for our computation procedures. This property 
is exploited as follows. The triplet (.a,s,z) is subject to an 
ergodic Markov chain with no cyclically moving subsets. The 
invariant distribution for the Markov chain generating 
(<a,s,z) is the fraction of time an individual is in state (a,s,z) in 
the limit as the sample period goes to infinity. Distribution ¥ 
is the unique solution to this linear equation: 
(19) Via'Xz') = £ V(a,s,z)x(z,z')n(s/) 
where the summation is over the (a,s,z) for which a = 
f(a,s,z). 
The method we employ to compute is successive ap-
proximations. The right side of (17) defines a function which 
maps probability distributions into probability distributions. 
Let T denote this function. The invariant distribution H' that 
we seek is the fixed point of T: 
(20) ¥ = T(V). 
Since the Markov chain process is ergodic and there are no 
cyclically moving subsets, the sequence generated by 
(21) V„+1 = T(V„) 
converges to this fixed point of T. We found 800 model peri-
ods, that is, 100 years, to be more than sufficient for initial 
conditions to disappear. In making welfare comparisons when 
there is aggregate uncertainty, we use this distribution
 VF. 
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Results of Experiments 
In this section we present results obtained from various exper-
iments that analyze economies with different monetary ar-
rangements. The section is organized as follows. First we ex-
amine the statistical properties of economies with a 100 per-
cent reserve requirement. The welfare of an individual is 
computed for economies with different inflation rates. Then 
we introduce fluctuations in the inflation rate to this type of 
economy and examine how the magnitude and persistence of 
those fluctuations affect the average welfare of individuals. 
Finally, we introduce an intermediation technology that per-
mits interest to be paid on deposits. 
Economies With a 100% Reserve Requirement... 
Again, our first experiments employ an extreme monetary ar-
rangement, namely, a 100 percent reserve requirement with 
no interest paid on reserves. With this particular arrangement, 
there are no intermediation costs and the nominal interest rate 
on deposits is zero. Thus, in this world, the real return on de-
posits is equal to minus the inflation rate. In effect, there is a 
single asset, namely, currency. We consider inflation rates of 
0 percent, 2.5 percent, 5 percent, 7.5 percent, and 10 percent. 
In each economy, the inflation rate does not fluctuate. 
We are examining how the welfare of individuals is re-
duced by seigniorage. For this reason, as we vary the inflation 
rate across economies, we vary the income tax rate 0 in such 
a way that the government purchases of goods and services 
do not change. Thus, in all the experiments reported, we are 
comparing seigniorage with a labor income tax. Table 1 sum-
marizes the statistical properties of these economies. 
In these experiments, government expenditures are con-
stant at approximately 20 percent of output. Velocity for these 
economies can be computed by dividing annual consumption 
by average asset holdings. For example, in the case of zero 
inflation, velocity is 2.6175, which is equal to 5.8648 divided 
by 2.2406. Velocity is 3.3750 when inflation is 5 percent. 
This implies an interest semi-elasticity of 5, which is the 
number Lucas (1981) uses when he estimates the cost of in-
flation with Bailey's (1956) method. 
We can study the behavior of individuals in economies 
with different inflation rates by examining Table 1. In econo-
mies with higher inflation, individuals work more; conse-
quently, average consumption is higher. With higher inflation, 
however, individuals have lower real asset holdings on aver-
age, and as a result of this, volatility of consumption as mea-
sured by the standard deviation of their consumption is 
greater. Examining the average utility in these economies re-
veals that welfare is lower if the inflation rate is higher. 
The loss, or cost, associated with higher inflation rates can 
be calculated by finding the percentage increase in consump-
tion that is necessary for agents to be as well off as they 
would be in the zero inflation economy. This cost is reported 
in the last column of Table 1. 
Overall for these economies, seigniorage is a poor tax rela-
tive to an income tax. For example, with 5 percent inflation, 
consumption must be scaled up by 0.5 percent for agents to 
be as well off as those in the zero inflation economy. As wel-
fare losses go, this is not a small number. In 1990, U.S. ag-
gregate consumption was $3,658 billion, and 0.5 percent of 
this number is $18.29 billion. 
One interesting finding is that the cost of inflation does not 
increase with the square of the inflation rate in this economy. 
If we apply the Bailey (1956) method, the estimated cost, 
Table 1 
Statistical Properties of Economies With a 100% Reserve Requirement* 
Variables (Average Levels) Revenue as a % 
After-Tax of0utPutFrom
 Cost of Inflation 
Inflation  Real Return  Asset  Employment  Income  as a % of 
Rate (%)  on Deposits (%)  Utility  Consumption**  Holdings  Rate (%)  Tax  Seigniorage  Consumption! 
.0  .0  -2843  5.8648  2.2406  92.16  20.37  .00  — 
2.5  -2.5  -.2851  5.8682  1.9248  92.26  19.71  .65  .3 
5.0  -5.0  -.2857  5.8711  1.7396  92.35  19.20  1.15  .5 
7.5  -7.5  -.2864  5.8742  1.6083  92.45  18.75  1.59  .7 
10.0  -10.0  -.2869  5.8771  1.5124  92.54  18.36  1.97  .9 
*ln these economies, the cost of intermediation and the nominal interest rate on deposits are zero and government expenditures 
are constant at about 20% of output. 
**These are annual rates. 
tThese numbers are the % increase in consumption needed for average utility to be as high as in the zero inflation economy. 
7 which is the area under the demand for money function, in-
creases with the square of the inflation rate. This demonstrates 
that the standard approach for measuring the cost of inflation 
provides a poor measure of the inflation cost associated with 
the consumption-smoothing role of liquid assets. 
... And Inflation Volatility 
Now we introduce inflation volatility. The inflation policy 
rule for these experiments is ^(1) = 1.00 and e(2) = 1.05, 
while the process on z is such that, for z e {1,2}, 
(22) prob{z,+1 = z|z, = z} = ty 
where the parameter <() is the persistence of changes in the in-
flation rate. The expected duration at a given inflation rate is 
1/(1 —c{>) model periods, each of which is one-eighth of a year. 
For <|> = 1/2, the inflation rates are independently and identi-
cally distributed over time. 
The question we ask here is, What is the cost of volatility 
in inflation relative to no volatility? Thus, we compare the av-
erage utility of an agent in an economy with a 2.5 percent 
constant inflation rate to the average utility of an agent in 
economies where the inflation rate fluctuates between 0 and 
5 percent with different persistences. 
Our answer is that inflation rate volatility adds virtually 
nothing to the cost of inflation associated with the consump-
tion-smoothing role of liquid assets. In these economies, real 
rates of return are identical on average; thus, average utilities 
are identical. This is true whether or not changes in the in-
flation rate are persistent and regardless of how persistent they 
are. These findings are in sharp contrast to the findings if the 
cost of inflation is estimated as the area under the demand for 
money function. 
Economies With Intermediation 
Finally, we set the deposit reserve requirement ratio below 
100 percent, and as a result, in equilibrium the agents use the 
intermediation technology explained in the first section of the 
paper. 
In Table 2, we report statistical properties of economies 
with different monetary arrangements. These arrangements 
specify a reserve requirement ratio, RR; a nominal return on 
T-bills, RTB; and an inflation rate. The parameters of the inter-
mediation technology are given by a variable intermediation 
cost, and a fixed cost, o^. 
The top half of Table 2 describes three economies with an 
after-tax real return on deposits of 0 percent. The monetary 
arrangements in those economies are quite different. For ex-
ample, the first economy has no inflation, no nominal return 
on T-bills, and no reserve requirement. 
In the next economy, the inflation rate and the nominal 
return on T-bills are both set at 3 percent and the annual real 
cost of having an account, o^, is chosen to be 0.008. With the 
average consumption of 5.857, the ratio of o^ to average con-
sumption is 0.00137. If we take annual per capita consump-
tion to be $20,000, this would correspond to a fixed cost of 
approximately $27 annually. The reserve requirement and the 
intermediation cost in this economy are taken to be zero; thus, 
the nominal interest on deposits is the same as the nominal in-
terest on T-bills. Minimum deposits implied by the monetary 
arrangement and the intermediation technology in this case 
are 0.27. For this economy, average asset holdings are 
2.2421; individuals whose asset holdings are below 0.27 do 
not earn any nominal interest. Thus, agents in this economy 
sometimes use currency and sometimes use deposits to 
smooth their consumption. 
The third economy in Table 2 has a 3 percent inflation 
rate, a 6 percent nominal interest rate, and a reserve require-
ment rate set at 49 percent. Minimum deposits implied in this 
case are again 0.27. 
Clearly, these three economies have very different mone-
tary arrangements; however, they are chosen such that the 
after-tax real return on deposits in each one of them is 0 per-
cent. Also, for these economies, resources used in intermedia-
tion are about 0.12 percent of output. Examining the statistical 
properties of these economies reveals that they are almost 
identical in their equilibrium levels of average consumption, 
employment, and asset holdings. Thus, the welfare levels are 
the same. 
The same observations can be made by examining the 
three economies in the bottom half of Table 2. In these econ-
omies, the after-tax real return on deposits is -5 percent. 
There is a slight difference between the first of these econo-
mies and the other two. Annually, resources used up in inter-
mediation are zero in the first economy and 0.12 percent in 
the others. In the economies with the same real return on de-
posits and the same total intermediation cost, average con-
sumption, employment, and welfare are the same. In all the 
economies examined in this section, government expenditures 
are constant and equal to about 20 percent of output. The 
above findings show that what is crucial in the consumption-
smoothing world is the after-tax real return on deposits and 
what has to be evaluated is the entire monetary arrangement. 
Using this environment, we can examine how individual 
welfare is reduced when a government uses seigniorage as a 
tax. In these economies with stationary equilibria and no ag-
gregate uncertainty, we can define seigniorage as the differ-
ence between government expenditures other than interest 
paid on government debt and government revenues collected 
through the labor income tax. In Table 2, revenues collected 
through seigniorage are reported for each of the six monetary 
arrangements. As we have seen above, economies with differ-
ent monetary arrangements yield the same welfare if the after-
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Table 2 
Statistical Properties of Economies With Intermediation 
Revenue as a % 
of Output From 
Real Return 
Monetary Arrangements (%) 
Asset  Employment  Income 
on Deposits (%)  Inflation  RR 
RTB  Utility  Consumption!  Holdings  Rate (%)  Tax  Seigniorage 
0*  0  0  0  -.2847  5.8568  2.2384  92.16  20.47  .00 
3  0  3  -.2847  5.8570  2.2421  92.16  20.07  .30 
3  49  6  -.2847  5.8570  2.2421  92.16  20.07  .30 
-5**  6  30  1  -.2858  5.8716  1.7233  92.37  19.07  1.27 
6  43  3  -.2863  5.8616  1.7225  92.36  19.21  1.14 
6  71  6  -.2863  5.8616  1.7225  92.36  19.21  1.14 
fThese are annual rates. 
*ln these three economies, the annual intermediation costs are a0 = 0.008 and a1 = 0. 
**ln these three economies, an = 0. However, in the first, a. = 0, while in the other two, a, = 1. 
tax real return on deposits is the same. For those economies, 
it is worth noting that the seigniorage collected is also identi-
cal. 
In order to examine the welfare implications, we compare 
economies with 0 and -5 percent after-tax real returns. In 
Table 3 we have documented that in the United States the av-
erage after-tax real return on saving deposits was -4.6 in the 
1974-78 period, slightly negative in the 1964-68 period, and 
slightly positive in the 1984-88 period. Thus, the variations 
that we are considering are in line with those which actually 
occurred in the United States in the postwar period. 
Average utility in economies with a zero after-tax real rate 
is -0.2847. In those economies, the total amount of resources 
used up in intermediation is 0.12 percent of output. In econo-
mies with a -5 percent real return and the same amount of in-
termediation cost, average utility goes down to -0.2863. The 
welfare loss is about 0.5 percent of consumption. If we com-
pare the average utility in the -5 percent real return economy 
to the one with a zero real return, both with zero intermedia-
tion cost, again we find the welfare loss to be about 0.5 per-
cent of consumption. That is, with a -5 percent real interest 
rate, consumption must be scaled up by 0.5 percent for agents 
to be as well off as those in an economy with a 0 percent 
after-tax real return. 
Notice that the welfare loss of a -5 percent after-tax real 
interest rate found in this environment with intermediation, 
where agents use currency and deposits to smooth out con-
sumption, is the same as the welfare loss found in the envi-
ronment of Table 1, where agents use currency only to 
Table 3 
Average Real Returns in the United States 
Period 










1964-68  1.4  .5  .0  -7 
1974-78  -1.7  -2.7  -3.9  -4.6 
1984-88  4.0  3.0  .8  .9 
'Nominal rates are converted to real rates using the implicit price deflator of the gross national 
product. 
33% income tax is assumed. 
fFor 1984-88, this is the Super-NOW account rate. For the earlier periods, this is the maximum 
rate allowed under Regulation Q. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
smooth out consumption because of a 100 percent reserve re-
quirement. In fact, seigniorage is given the best chance in an 
economy with a 100 percent reserve requirement. This is due 
to the facts that some real resources are used up in intermedi-
ation and there is no intermediation with a 100 percent re-
serve requirement. In the economy with such a reserve re-
quirement and a -5 percent real return, the average utility is 
-0.2857, whereas in the economy with a positive intermedia-
tion cost and a -5 percent real return, the average utility is 
-0.2863. The welfare loss associated with this is 0.18 percent 
of consumption and is entirely a function of the intermedia-
tion cost. 
9 To summarize, the findings suggest that what matters in 
the consumption-smoothing world is the after-tax real return 
on deposits and that seigniorage is a poor tax relative to an in-
come tax for this sort of economy. In evaluating the welfare 
effect of seigniorage as a tax, the results found in 100 percent 
reserve requirement economies carry over to economies with 
intermediation. In fact, keeping the real return constant, we 
find that welfare is reduced slightly more with intermediation 
since some real resources are used up in that activity. 
Summary 
In this paper we analyze the welfare effects of various mone-
tary arrangements in a general equilibrium model where a 
technology to intermediate large-denomination nominal bills 
that the government issues is introduced. This extension 
allows us to examine economies where agents hold currency 
and deposits at financial institutions in order to smooth out 
consumption. 
Our findings indicate that what is crucial in the consump-
tion-smoothing world is the after-tax real return on deposits 
and what has to be evaluated is the entire monetary arrange-
ment. Two arrangements with identical inflation rates and 
government expenditures can have very different costs. What 
must be evaluated is a complete arrangement which must 
specify the nature of the tax system and the legal constraints 
that are employed. 
For the economies examined, we find that the seigniorage 
tax is not a good one relative to a tax on labor income. If the 
after-tax real return is -5 percent, as it was in the 1974—78 
period in the United States, welfare is approximately half a 
percent of consumption lower than it would be if the after-tax 
real return were zero, as it approximately was in the United 
States in the 1964-68 and 1984-88 periods. Half a percent of 
1990 U.S. consumption is over $18 billion. 
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